The Four Causes (abstract, pdf)

The Aristotelian doctrine of four causes naturally arises from the combination of the two distinctions (a) between things and changes, and (b) between that which potentially is a certain thing or change and what it potentially is.

 Tugenden und Absichten (abstract, pdf)

Intentions are not events that cause an action, but that in terms of which we describe and action when we describe it as intentionally. Likewise, virtues are not character traits that reliably cause certain behaviour, but that in terms of which we describe certain generic behaviour.

Intention and Virtue (pdf)

This is not a translation of "Tugenden und Absichten," but a presentation with similar content. Among other things, I argue that intentions are terms in which intentional actions are properly classified and described; and virtues are for generic actions what intentions are particular actions.

Substance, Reality, and Distinctness (abstract, pdf)

Descartes claims that God is a substance and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible.