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Jorge V. Arregui, Descartes and Wittgenstein on Emotions, International Philosophical Quarterly vol. 36, no. 3, issue no. 143, 1996, 319-34. Wittgenstein wird egen einen nicht näher untersuchten Descartes ausgespielt. Aspekte von Emotionen:
Die Zusammenhänge sind begrifflich, nicht in erforschbarer Weise kausal (p. 319, vgl. Yandells Rede von 'divinely imposed laws', 1999 p. 207). Emotione, then, can be understood as the manifestation of a relation to the world, as expressing our belonging to the world; it is deeper than the intellectual dichotomy between subject and object. Feeling reveals our being in the world in a way that precedes any theoretical rationality since on the level of affectivity the way in which the object is given to us is the way in which we are modified by the object; therefore affectivity is a point of view on the world. (...) Affectivity determines our way of being in the world (p. 334). For Descartes an emotion or passion is essentially a pensé, a perception, something of which we have an immediate awareness; that is, a pensée is a state of the self-consciousness (p. 320). In the Cartesian approach (...) an emotion is defined as a mental experience defined in itself (p. 331). Descartes teile die cogitationes wie folgt auf:
Generelles Vorurteil: For emotions, esse est percipi (p.320). Dagegen (Wittgenstein, Ryle): Is to be jealous or angry the same as to feel jealousy or anger? (p. 323) Allerdings: I do not need to infer my mental states from my behaviour (p. 325). Wittgenstein distinguishes between descriptions and expressions of emotions (p. 327, vgl. PU 187). Wittgenstein habe behauptet, menatle Zustände und physikalische Daten seien nicht genug, um Emotionen zu definieren. Was dazu kommen müsse, sei die Rede von typischen Verhaltensweise (p. 329). Oder, Only one who can manifest an emotion can experience it (p. 331). (Vgl. dazu Dretske: was fehlt, ist eine Erklärungsrelation.) |
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