Timothy J. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and Suarez, NY Lnd 1987

Textgetreue Wiedergabe der Ideen- und Substanzlehre von Descartes, Suarez und anderen.

Für Cronin ist die cartesische Theorie de objektiven Realität von Ideen dessen einziges Mittel, die Existenz der Außenwelt zu beweisen, und daher zentral.

... his sole means of escape from solipsism is by way of the objective reality of his ideas (p. 1).

Über Thomas:

There is no room for the distinction between formal reality and objective reality. (...); in his system of thought there is no meaning to objective reality or to that being which lies as a known reality between the act of the knowing intellect and the existing sensible thing (p. 77).

Duns Scotus:

Hence, the objective being of the divine ideas is sufficiently distinct from and other than God, for they can be known as they are in themselves although God is not known (p. 198).

Suarez:

It is the objective concept or that being which, as existing neither in the intellect nor in things, is that state of essence which is within the intellect as the thing known or the subject (p. 84).

Descartes:

No matter of how objective or how real an objective reality may be, it must as everything real have a cause. Since the thinking substance is as yet the only actual being, the ego must ask if it is the cause of the reality thought. Can the reality of the subject account for and explain the relaity of every object known? (p. 92)

Mit anderen Worten: Die res extensa ist zwar hinreichender Grund für die Existenz ihrer Modi, der Ideen. Wozu ihre bloße Existenz nicht hinreicht, ist, den Unterschied zwischen den Ideen zu erklären. Zur Unterscheidung von Ideen ist, modern argumentiert, eine Sprache nötig (Freges Holismus, Davidson), und es gibt keine Privatsprache, die mir Unterscheidungen festzuhalten erlauben könnte (Wittgenstein). Also kann der Unterschied zwischen Ideen nicht allein aus dem ego stammen. Unterschieden sind die Ideen aber schon allein deshalb voneinander, weil ja die Idee der res cogitans selbst clare et distincte ist.

Applying the principle of causality to the objective reality of the idea of angels, men and animals, Descartes sees that this reality can be adequately explained by the combination of the objective reality of the idea of God and of corporeal things. The idea of God certainly contains at least eminently whatever perfection or reality these inferior realities possess (p. 102).

Gott steht hier also für die Möglichkeit ein, Unterschiede in allgemeinster Form zu ziehen, und nicht nur aus Anlaß einer Sinnesempfindung.

In the Discours Descartes attains in that mode or action of thinking which is doubting a two-fold intuition. The first is the 'Dubito, ergo sum', and the second is that which can be expressed in 'Dubito, ergo Deus est'; in truth, one could reverse this statement and show that it is by reason of God's actual existence or reality that not only do we have the objective reality of the idea of God, but that we can know that we doubt (p. 106).

In this manner Descartes argues: were I the cause of myself and the objective reality of my ideas, I would obviously be all-perfect, and be God. I would not doubt, nor wish, nor lack any perfection (p. 112).

Die objektive Realität einer Idee ist das in ihr vorgestellte ohne Ansheung seiner actualitas; insofern tritt die objektive Realität die Nachfolge der thomistischen Essenz (im Ggs. zur Existenz - Avicenna) an.