Anthony Kenny, Descartes the Dualist, Ratio 12, 1999, 114-27

In this article I have been defendig, against recent criticism, the traditional interpretation of Descartes as an interactionist dualist (p. 127)

Descartes habe mit seiner Theorie der Sinne vor, das Wort 'sentire' zu desambiguieren.

1. sentire = seeming to see: AT VII 29 (p. 115); Primary Cartesian sense in which it means a pure mentalistic cogitatio (p. 117)
2. Secondary Cartesian sense in which it includes a judgement of the will (p. 117)
3. Secondary Cartesian sense in which it means a mechanistic motio, common to humans and animals (ebd.)

Kenny kritisiert Baker und Morris, DescartesīDualism, dafür, daß sie nur die ersteren beiden Sinne anerkennen.

They are wrong to think that Descartes regards 'It seems to me that I see light' as a judgement. (...) For Descartes it is it is a thought which it is possible to have without making a judgement at all. (p. 118)

'three-stage account of the operations of sense-perception': AT VII 436-7 (p. 116, vgl. Reed):

1. stimulation of the body
2. effects produced in the mind
3. judgement about things

'both perception and jusgement are thoughts (cogitationes), but only the latter, unlike the former, are acts of the will': AT VII 56 und 60 (p. 116f.).

Distinkte perception:

It is only when you realize that a sensation is strictly speaking no more than a thought that you percieve it distinctly (p. 121).

Trialism (bzgl. AT III 665): Rozemond weise Cottinghams Ansatz zu recht zurück, habe aber Unrecht, indem Descartes eben doch Interaktionist sei.

Union does not explain interaction; rather, soul-on-body causation and body-on-soul causation are the two species of interaction of which 'union' names the genus (p. 123).

Sensation in the strict sense, sense (B) [d.i. der erste], can, I believe, be conceived as taking place in a soul unattached to a body (p. 125)