Eponymy

• Aristotle, 987b3-15 and 1217b2-15
• Proclus, In Parmenidem, ed. Cousin, 850; 879-80, 881, 886-7; 890, 911, 913-15.
• Asclepius, In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum, ed. Hayduck, p. 75.21-34.
• Syrianus, In Metaph., ed. Kroll, 111.33-112.2
• Simplicius, In Categ., ed. Kalbfleisch, 77.21-6
• Peck
• Taylor, The Parmenides of Plato, p. 25-6
• Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 93-4
• Allen, Participation and Predication
• Cresswell, Participation in Plato's Parmenides
• Moravcsik, The TMA
• Levin, Platonic Eponymy and the Literary Tradition
• Shiner, Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument
• White, Plato's middle dialogues and the independence of particulars.
• Bestor: statement of view that sensible phenomena are eponyms of ideas.
• Bestor, Common Properties and Eponymy in Plato: eponymy does not imply shared properties.
• White, Plato on Naming After
• Sellars: An idea can correspond to an F by virtue of its content not by being F but by merely being a counterpart of F. (Cf. Shiner.)
• Eponymy and focal meaning: Moravcsik; Bestor, Semantics and Plato's Parmenides, p. 42.
• Frede, Phaidon

The name "F" primarily applies to the form F, and only derivatively to the things that participate in this form.

• Allen: the F things are named after the form F.
• Prauss: only the F in the thing is strictly speaking an instance of F, the thing is F in a derived sense. (Cf. Bluck)
• Geach: the standard pound weighs one pound in a very different sense.
• Nehamas: only the form F is really F, the things are only F by participating in it.
• Clegg: Only the form F is really F, its instances are only would-be Fs (and nothing other than that)
• Mann: Plato vs. Aristotle on eponymy.