INSTANCE IS THE CONVERSE OF ASPECT

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According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity.

Keywords: instantiation, universals, aspects, cross-count identity, indifferentism, Donald Baxter

1. Preliminaries

There have been two main theories of predication in the history of philosophical semantics: the scholastic copula theory and Frege’s functional analysis of predication. More recently, scholars have identified a third alternative in Aristotle, which might be called the aspect theory of predication. This theory is partly motivated by an observation that Mohan Matthen made a couple of decades ago [1983: 126]: that, in Ancient Greek, simple sentences of the form ‘A is B’ may always be read as ‘A-B is.’ For instance, ‘Plato is pale’ may be read as ‘Pale-Plato is.’ The second formulation may be understood as ‘Plato qua pale exists’ [Bäck 2000], so that the ‘is’ in ‘A is B’ is an existential ‘is’, not a copula [De Rijk 2002].

Corresponding to the aspect theory of predication, there is an aspect theory of instantiation. Among its proponents are Donald Baxter [2001], Ian Underwood [2010], and, in some respects, a temporal part of David Armstrong [2004; cf. 2005: 317]. According to Baxter, an aspect of a thing is this thing in a respect. For instance, Socrates in so far as he is seated is an aspect of Socrates. This aspect comes into existence when Socrates takes a seat and it ceases to exist when he stands up. It corresponds to the complex entity that exists, according to the aspect theory of predication, when ‘Seated-Socrates is’ is true. Baxter argues that when a particular instantiates a universal, there are two such aspects: (1) the particular in so far as it instantiates the universal, and (2) the universal in so far as it is instantiated by the particular. When Plato instantiates the universal paleness, for instance, there are the following two aspects: Plato qua pale and paleness qua

1 Armstrong embraces the idea that instantiation is a kind of qualified identity, but he does not actually use, or understand, the notion of an aspect [2004: 142 n.3].

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exemplified by Plato. According to the aspect theory of instantiation, these two aspects are in some sense the same.

In this paper, I will focus on Baxter’s version of the aspect theory of instantiation. To keep things simple, I will ignore relations and relational predicates. Further, I will deal only with kind instantiation. (I will thus use ‘universal’ and ‘kind’ interchangeably.) Kind instantiation differs from property instantiation as follows. When Plato is pale, he instantiates the property, paleness, but he is not a kind of paleness. By being a mammal, in contrast, Plato instantiates a kind. He does not have a mammal as one of his properties; he is a kind of mammal. This is a difference on the level of linguistic expressions, and I don’t know whether this difference implies an ontological one. All I propose here is to stick to one set of expressions, namely the ones that classify things as specimens of kinds, as opposed to those that attribute properties to things. I do this mainly because it makes it easier to state the main idea of the aspect theory of instantiation: that universals are in some respect the same as their instances. For grammatical reasons, Plato cannot be the same as paleness. Plato is a particular human being and paleness is a property, and there is no way in which particular human beings are the same as properties. In contrast, there are no grammatical reasons against identifying, in some sense to be specified, Plato and the kind mammal. After all, whereas Plato is not a paleness, he is a kind of mammal.

I will not, by the way, be interested in the distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. As far as I am concerned, item on my desk is a perfectly good kind. Readers who think otherwise may be better able to follow my argument by replacing all references to kinds with references to what they take to be natural kinds.

So much for preliminaries. Let me now outline Baxter’s version of the aspect theory of instantiation. After presenting it in rough outline, I will further explain and discuss some of the details.

2. An Aspect Theory of Instantiation

According to Baxter’s version of the aspect theory, instantiation occurs when an aspect of a particular is cross-count identical with an aspect of a universal [2001: 453]. This theory involves the following four moves.

The first is to assume an ontology that includes particulars, universals (i.e. kinds of particulars), and aspects of particulars. Both particulars and universals are taken to be ‘single things’ [Baxter 2001: 454] or ‘ones’ [Armstrong 2004: 141], and aspects are taken to be numerically the same as their bearers [Baxter 1999: 46]. That is, when Socrates is seated, we don’t count two entities, Socrates and seated Socrates, but only one.

Baxter’s second move [1988] is to distinguish different ways of counting things, or ‘counts’ for short. In one count, for instance, Socrates and Hypatia are two distinct individuals. They are two particular human beings. In another count, they may count as one and the same, since both are a philosopher. The distinction between counts is similar to Peirce’s distinction between two ways of counting words on a page [1931–58: 4: 537].
Intuitively, the idea is that when we count particular items (tokens), we end up with a different number than when we count kinds of items (types). The previous sentence, for instance, contains twenty-six particular words but only twenty-one kinds of word.

Third, Baxter assumes that universals have aspects, too [2001: 450–3]. Just as one may speak of Plato qua pale, one may speak of the kind something pale qua instantiated by Plato. This is to treat being instantiated by Plato as a property of a universal.

The fourth move is to introduce the notion of identity across counts [Baxter 1988]. There is one count for particulars and a different count for universals. So if particulars and their kinds are to be the same in any sense, they must be the same across counts.

This completes the aspect theory of instantiation. According to this theory, that Socrates instantiates the kind seated thing means that there is an aspect of Socrates that is also an aspect of the kind seated thing. This aspect can be described in two ways: (1) as Socrates qua seated thing or (2) as seated thing qua instantiated by Socrates. Socrates is the same as seated Socrates, seated Socrates is the same as seated thing qua instantiated by Socrates, and this is the same as the kind, seated thing. These identities, however, are not all within the same count. So in total, the relation of a particular to a kind it instantiates is cross-count partial identity. In one count the particular is the same as one of its aspects, and in a different count this aspect is the same as the kind.

In the remainder of this paper, I will go through each of these four moves in more detail. I will be asking the following two questions. (1) Which part of the aspect theory is new? (2) Is this part worth maintaining in this form? Answering the first question will involve attributing accounts of instantiation to various historical figures. This will not be done for its own sake, but merely in order to focus on the part of the aspect theory that deserves most scrutiny. We will also be able to draw a couple of important lessons from the tradition. Note that, for this purpose, it is enough to establish that certain readings of past philosophers are at least possible.

I will first extract the notion of an aspect from Aristotle, and with it the idea that numerically one thing may be many different things. This corresponds, roughly, to Baxter’s first move. I will also find something close to the idea that kinds of things can be counted in Aristotle, and something close to the idea that universals have aspects in later authors. These are analogues of Baxter’s second and third moves. It will be important, however, that Aristotle and his followers do not actually say that universals can be counted, strictly speaking, nor do they say that universals have aspects. These observations will ultimately lead to a simplified aspect theory of instantiation, which omits Baxter’s fourth move.

3. Aspects

Taking the existence of particulars and universals as unproblematic, the first thing we need for an aspect theory of instantiation is the notion of an aspect. In Aristotle, the closest thing to Baxter’s aspects are what Frank Lewis
[1991] calls accidental compounds. When Socrates is seated, for instance, seated Socrates is an accidental compound.

Aristotle says that Socrates and seated Socrates are ‘accidentally the same’. He discusses this kind of sameness in Metaphysics Δ, his philosophical dictionary, in the chapters on the several senses of ‘one’ [Δ 6] and ‘the same’ [Δ 9]. In the accidental sense of ‘one’, for instance, the following are one (not three): Coriscus, someone educated, and the educated Coriscus [Δ 6: 1015b16–19]. Accordingly, in the accidental sense of ‘same’, an educated man is the same as a man and the same as someone educated [Δ 9: 1017b27–33]. In general, where A is a thing and B is an accident of A, Aristotle says that A and the accidental compound A qua B are accidentally the same.

In Topics I 7, Aristotle lists accidental sameness as a kind of numerical sameness [103a23–31], and he contrasts numerical sameness with sameness in genus or species [103a8–9]. More specifically, he says that things that differ in number can nonetheless be the same in genus or species [103a10–14]. So it seems that accidental sameness is a kind of sameness in number. Some things that are one in number are so accidentally. In general, whenever A and B are accidentally the same, they are in fact one in number, whereas when A and B are the same in genus or species, they may be two in number. In particular, accidental compounds are numerically the same as the substances that are involved in them.

It is important to note that on the other hand, Aristotle does see a distinction between a thing (e.g. Coriscus) and the accidental compounds it is involved in (e.g. educated Coriscus). They are not the same without qualification, but only accidentally so. They differ, as he says, in being. In Topics V 4, for instance, he says that when a man is pale, the man and the pale man are the same, but for the man to be a man is not the same as for the pale man to be a pale man [133b31–36]. They differ in being.

What does it mean that two things are the same but not the same in being? In general, two things are the same in being if they belong to the same kind, so that there is something they both are. Two things are the same in being K if they are both K, and they are the same in being (simpliciter) if there is a K such that they are both K. Socrates and Coriscus, for instance, are both human beings, and to this extent they are the same in being. They are the same in that they are both human. It is possible that two things are both the same and different in being. For instance, Socrates and Bucephalus belong to the same kind (mammal), but also to different kinds (human and horse). They are the same in being mammals, but not the same in other respects. Two things may be said to be strictly the same in being if they do not at all differ in being. Two things that are strictly the same in being may still differ in number: that is, there may be two numerically distinct items that instantiate all the same kinds.

Aristotle’s accidental compounds are things in respects. They are the same in number, but not the same in being as the thing that they are in a respect. Seated Socrates, for instance, is the same in number but not the same in being as Socrates: we count them as one, but being one of them is not the same as being the other one. Socrates need not cease to exist when seated Socrates ceases to exist. One may think of accidental compounds as pairs of
a particular substance (e.g. Coriscus) and something in addition. This additional part cannot be another substance. For instance, Coriscus cannot accidentally be the same as a man (a substance), since for Coriscus to be Coriscus is for him to be a particular man. He cannot cease to be this man without ceasing to be Coriscus. Coriscus is the same in being as a man; and if two things are the same in being, they are not merely accidentally the same.

Therefore, accidental compounds must consist of a substance and a non-substantial entity. Since I am focusing on kind instantiation (as opposed to property instantiation), I prefer not to think of these non-substantial entities as properties. I will help myself to the notion of a specimen of a kind, which Lynne Spellman introduces in her discussion of Aristotle [1995]. I take accidental compounds to be pairs of specimens of kinds.

Aristotle distinguishes between substantial and non-substantial kinds. This distinction may not always be easy to draw, but for now we need to take it as given. For instance, Plato, a man, and a mammal are specimens of substantial kinds. Someone seated, something pale, and someone educated, in contrast, are specimens of non-substantial kinds. Think of specimens of non-substantial kinds as things, merely in so far as they fall under a non-substance category (quality, quantity, relation, etc.). According to Aristotle, specimens of non-substantial kinds cannot exist unless they coincide with a specimen of a substantial kind. For instance, there can be no pale thing that is not also some kind of substance. Accidental compounds may thus be thought of as pairs of (1) a specimen of a substantial kind and (2) a specimen of a non-substantial kind. Educated Coriscus, for instance, is the pair \(<\text{Coriscus}, \text{someone educated}>\).

Note that I am simplifying Aristotle’s theory of predication for my present purposes. In Aristotle, there is a distinction between three kinds of compound: (a) accidental compounds, (b) essential unities, and (c) form-matter compounds. (a) In an accidental compound, such as pale Plato, a substance happens to coincide with a non-substance. (b) Rational animal, in contrast, is an essential unity. According to Aristotle, it is not an accidental compound consisting of two different specimens of kinds, but one unified thing to begin with [De Interpretatione 11: 20b15–19]. (c) Whether form-matter compounds are accidental compounds, essential unities, or something third, is a matter of controversy.\(^2\) In the present context, I mention these three kinds of unity only to set aside two of them, (b) and (c). I will proceed as though all compounds of a particular and a kind were (sufficiently like) accidental compounds.

I will thus attribute the following simplified claim to Aristotle:

ARISTOTLE: When a particular A instantiates a kind B, there is such a thing as A qua B, so that A and A qua B are the same in number but not (strictly) the same in being.

\(^2\) Proponents of the view that substantial forms are accidents of matter include Kung [1978: 154], Loux [1991: 63, 121], Lewis [1991: 289], Rea [1998: 326–7], and Cohen [2009: 209]. Among the opponents are Witt [1989: 128] and Wedin [2000: 192]. I like to think of the relation between matter and form as one between a potential substance and an actual substance, so that matter is individuated in terms of what it potentially is. This does not go well with the idea that the form is an accident of matter.
For instance, when Plato instantiates the kind *someone pale*, there is such a thing as Plato *qua* pale (more specifically: Plato *qua* specimen of the kind *someone pale*), so that Plato and Plato *qua* pale are the same in number but not (strictly) the same in being. They are the same in number because we don’t count them as two distinct individuals. They are not the same in being, because being Plato is not the same as being pale Plato. The accidental compound, Plato *qua* pale, is what Baxter calls an aspect.

So we have two elements of the aspect theory of instantiation in place already in Aristotle. First, he has the notion of an aspect (a thing in a respect). Second, he maintains that aspects are numerically the same as the particular substances that are involved in them.

### 4. Counts

The next thing we need is a distinction between counts. Aristotle’s distinction between sameness in being and sameness in number seems to suggest a distinction between different ways of counting things. When we count particulars, we count Socrates and seated Socrates as one; when we count in terms of differences in being, we do not count snub-nosed Socrates and seated Socrates as one. For to be snub-nosed is not the same as to be seated; *snub-nosed thing* and *seated thing* are two different universals.

Can universals be counted in the same sense in which we count particulars? There are passages in Aristotle that seem to suggest that all differences in being induce a special way of counting things. For instance, he says that sameness in number implies sameness in genus and species [*Metaphysics* Δ 6: 1016b35–1017a1]. This means that, conversely, differences in genus or species imply differences in number. He also says that we count two things whenever there is a certain amount of discontinuity, a difference in definition (*logos*), or a difference in form (*eidos*) [1016b9–11]. Since differences in being are differences in either definition or form, any difference in being should thus again imply a difference in number. Further, in *Topics* VII 1, Aristotle writes that one may test whether two things are the same by asking whether they have the same accidents and are accidents of the same things [152a33–37], and this suggests that every difference implies a difference in number. Therefore, wherever there is a difference, there should also be a way of counting things. If seated Socrates differs from snub-nosed Socrates, there will then be a sense in which one may count them as two in number.

However, if sameness in number would imply sameness in genus and species, it would follow that, when Plato and Plato *qua* pale are numerically one thing, they must both be human beings and mammals. This would not go very well with Aristotle’s claim that accidental compounds such as pale Plato are not substances [cf. *Metaphysics* Z 4: 1030a3–6; Peterson 1985]. Mammals are substances, so if pale Plato is a mammal, he will also be a substance. But Aristotle denies that pale Plato is a substance. Therefore, sameness in number cannot actually imply sameness in being. But then differences in being will not always imply a difference in number.
Further, there are passages where Aristotle clearly says that numerically one and the same thing may differ (in being) from itself. For instance, he says that when Coriscus is masked, one may know about the masked one that he is approaching without knowing about Coriscus that he is approaching [Sophistical Refutations 24: 179a26–b33]. In this case, Aristotle admits that even though Coriscus and the masked one are the same in number, they differ in being [cf. Matthews 1982: 227; Lewis 1991: 121–8; Spellman 1995: 22–3]. This is a difference in being that does not imply a difference in number. Therefore, the passages referred to above should not be taken at face value. Probably, Aristotle merely wants to say that, where there are differences in being, one may reasonably expect a difference in number, not that every difference in being implies a difference in number. That is, when he says that snub-nosed Socrates and seated Socrates differ in being, we need not assume that he would literally count them as two different things.

In fact, as we have seen, Aristotle refers to only one of the several kinds of oneness as numerical oneness (arithmōn) [Metaphysics Δ 9, 1018a6]. There are other ways of being one (and many), which are not numerical.3 If a thing is many in one of these other senses, this does not add to the number of things there are. For instance, if Socrates is both seated and snub-nosed, he is not strictly speaking two things. Aristotle’s point here is basically that the difference between one particular instance of a kind and another one is unlike the difference between one kind and another one. Particulars differ in number; kinds differ in being.

It makes good sense to mark the difference between one particular and another one as numerical, because particulars may often be distinguished merely in terms of their position in space and time. Two particulars may instantiate the exact same kinds, so that they do not at all differ in being; but they may still differ in number. One can imagine a universe that contains nothing other than two exactly similar spheres [Black 1952: 156]; and although these spheres do not differ from one another by any generally specifiable feature, they are two and not one. Because this is possible, particulars cannot reliably be individuated merely in terms of their features; i.e. they cannot be defined in their particularity [cf. Metaphysics Z 11: 1036a28–29; Z 15: 1040a27–b4]. In order to distinguish two particulars, it is not always enough to describe them. Kinds of particulars, in contrast, cannot always be individuated merely by pointing at them. One may indeed point at kinds, namely by pointing at their instances. However, two different kinds may be present in the same location at the same time, so that they cannot be distinguished from each other merely by way of pointing. That is, in order to distinguish two universals, it is not always enough to point at their instances. They can only be individuated in terms of their descriptive features. In fact, the identity of a kind is exhausted by its definition, so that two kinds differ if and only if they differ from one another in being.

Note further that universals cannot actually be counted in any reliable way. There is usually a definite answer to the question of how many things

3 Note that one is not strictly speaking a number to the Greek mind [Metaphysics N: 1088a6; cf. Ross 1936: 604].
of a given kind there are in a given area. This answer may depend on the kind of thing we count, so that that we may end up with different numbers when counting shoes and pairs of shoes. Given a kind, however, the number is clear. There is only one correct answer to the question of how many human beings are in a given room, and different ways of counting them cannot change this answer. In contrast, there is usually no definite answer to the question of how many universals there are in a given setting. This answer depends on the level of detail and specificity and on how many kinds of things we care to imagine. Also, the boundaries between different kinds are often blurry. They may overlap in ways in which particulars may not. Therefore, universals cannot be counted in the same way as particulars can be counted.

Baxter and Armstrong treat universals as if they could be counted in a strict sense. They assume that there is a count for universals, just as there is one for particulars. Armstrong, for instance, speaks of ‘numerically different’ universals [Armstrong 2004: 146]. I have just argued that this can only be understood in a loose sense of ‘numerically’. There isn’t really a count for universals.

Let me tentatively put the following on record:

ARISTOTLE: There are several ways of being one or many. Particular substances can be one or many in number. Only they can be counted in a strict sense. If things other than particulars are many, they are not, strictly speaking, many in number.

I have dug a little deeper here because this will be important. There is, strictly speaking, only one way of counting things, the ‘numerical’ count, which determines the number of particular substances in the world.

5. Aspects of Universals

At this point, we have the following elements in place. First, Aristotle says that when a thing instantiates a kind, there is a compound that is the same in number as this particular but that differs from it in being. Such a compound is what Baxter calls an aspect. Second, Aristotle distinguishes between different ways of being many. In particular, he distinguishes being many in number from being many in being. These two elements add up as follows.

When Socrates and Hypatia instantiate the kind philosopher, there are two aspects, Socrates qua philosopher and Hypatia qua philosopher. Socrates qua philosopher is numerically the same as Socrates, and Hypatia qua philosopher is numerically the same as Hypatia. In a different sense of ‘same’, Socrates and Hypatia are the same, because they are both philosophers. They are the same in being.

In addition to all this, the aspect theory of instantiation has it that the kind philosopher has two aspects, too: philosopher qua instantiated by Socrates and philosopher qua instantiated by Hypatia. Universals are supposed to
have aspects in the same way as particulars do. As Armstrong puts it: ‘Particulars are ones running through many different universals, universals are ones running through many different particulars’ [2004: 141]. That is, just as Socrates qua philosopher is the same in number as Socrates, philosopher qua instantiated by Socrates should be the same in number as the kind philosopher.

I do not think that Aristotle takes universals to have aspects in the same sense in which particulars do. Particulars are the same in number as their aspects, and if universals cannot be counted in the same way as particulars, it seems difficult to attribute this kind of sameness to them. This part of the aspect theory of instantiation goes beyond the scope of Aristotle, but something similar to it surfaces in the later Aristotelian tradition. Porphyry, for instance, says that, on the one hand, all humans are one in so far as they are members of the same species. On the other hand, he adds: That which is one and common, i.e. the species, is many in so far as it is divided among particulars [Isagoge, CAG IV/1: 6, 21–2]. Just as the particulars are in a certain respect one, the kind is in a certain respect many. It is many in so far as it is exemplified by many instances.

The early mediaeval logician William of Champeaux seems to have implemented this view in a rather crude way. William is one of the teachers of Peter Abelard, and Abelard ascribes two theories of instantiation to him. The first of them is of interest now; we will get to the second one later. William’s first theory has it that universals underlie their several instances in the same way in which, according to Aristotle, a particular substance underlies its several instances in the same way in which, according to Aristotle, a particular substance underlies its many forms. Abelard states this as follows [Historia Calamitatum, ed. Monfrin: 65):

He [William] had a doctrine of the sharedness of universals, so that he maintained that substantially the same thing exists at once and as a whole in its single instances, and that there is no difference in substance among these instances but merely a diversity in the multitude of accidents.

According to this view, universals literally are single substances, and their instances are accidental features of them. There is only one human being, of which Socrates, Plato, and Hypatia are accidents. When Abelard discusses this view in his Glossae super Porphyrium, he does not attribute it to William, but he still seems to have his teacher in mind. He states it as follows [Glossae super Porphyrium, ed. Geyer I: 10,17–23]:

Some people take ‘universal thing’ in such a way that they set it up as substantially the same entity in things that differ from one another through forms.

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4 Porphyry presents this as an aspectival distinction, using a dative of respect (‘in virtue of’): ἰὲν μὴν γὰρ τῶν εἴδους μετοχιάτι σὲ πολλὰν ἀνθρώπων ἰσά, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ κατὰ μέρος ὅσα ἐστὶ κοινὸς πλείους.
5 If William held this view, he was not alone. Odo of Tournay relies on a sophisticated version of it in order to show that, when Adam and Eve sinned, we all did [De peccato originali II, MPL 160: 1078D–83D: cf. King 1982: 124–8]. Boethius already rejects a similar view in passing when he says that, if a genus is one in all its instances, it cannot be so by constituting the substance of these instances [In Isagogen ed. II, CSEL 48: 162, 21–2]. The view in question is also attacked by Ps.-Joscelin [De Generibus et speciebus, ed. King: 152] and defended by Walter of Mortagne [Tractatus quoniam de generali, ed. Hauréau: 299]. Cf. also King [1982: 138–50, 172–3]; Thompson [1995: 413–20].
This entity is the ‘material substance’ of the particulars it belongs to. It is one in itself, and diverse only through the forms of its inferiors. If these forms happened to be taken away from it, there would be no difference at all among the things [that instantiate the universal], which are in fact distinct from one another only by the diversity of forms. For the matter is entirely and substantially the same.

This is to say that universals are for their instances what the matter of a thing is for its forms. This way of putting it might be inspired partly by Aristotle’s occasional remarks that a genus is like matter for its species.\(^6\) Just as one and the same genus may be divided into several species by adding specific differences, one and the same universal may be divided into several instances by adding accidental forms.

As Abelard notes, universals cannot be the matter of their several instances in the sense in which a piece of wax may be the matter of different objects \([\text{Glossae super Porphyrium}, \text{ed. Geyer I: 10–11}]\). For it is assumed that the whole universal is matter for several particulars \(\text{at the same time}\). A piece of wax, however, can constitute two numerically distinct objects only by first constituting one of them and then the other one. So it is probably better to think of a universal as one thing under different descriptions, just as a person may be both your neighbour and your aunt at the same time [cf. Tweedale 1976: 98–107]. According to this view, Socrates is the kind \(\text{human being}\) under one description, and Hypatia is the same kind under a different description.

This is, of course, a weird view. It turns instantiation on its head, as it were. It treats universals as we would treat particulars, and it treats instantiation as we would treat property possession. For a kind to have an instance is for it to have a property, so that it is the underlying matter and the instance is one of its accidental forms. This makes it possible for universals to have aspects. If one universal, for instance, has two instances, these two instances will be two features of the universal, in the same way in which being seated and being snub-nosed are two features of Socrates. Therefore, this universal will also have two aspects.

All of this is vaguely similar to the view put forward by Baxter, that universals have aspects. But there is one obvious difference. Whereas Baxter ultimately wants to say that \(\text{aspects}\) of particulars are the same as aspects of universals, Porphyry and William suggest that \(\text{particulars}\) are aspects of universals.\(^7\)

There is another, less striking, but equally important difference. According to Baxter, universals have aspects in the same way in which particulars have aspects. That is, when exactly two particulars instantiate the same universal, this universal is \(\text{one in number and two in being}\). Baxter says that ‘the universal in so far as it is here is \(\text{numerically}\) identical with the universal in so far as it is there’ [2001: 452; my emphasis]. In contrast, Porphyry would

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\(^7\) Note that Marambio [2012: 464] ascribes this view to Baxter: ‘One of the aspects of property F is an object a in which it is instantiated.’
rather say that, when a universal is instantiated by two particulars, this universal is *one in being* but *two in number*. Porphyry’s theory is in fact fully compatible with Aristotle’s view, that only particulars are countable. He does not think of the underlying universal as numerically one thing that differs from itself in being; he thinks of it as one in being and many in number. This will turn out to be important.

For now, let us add the following to our list:

**PORPHYRY**: When a universal is instantiated by many particulars, the universal is in one sense many while it remains in another sense one.

This is as close as the Aristotelian tradition gets to the idea that universals have aspects. At this point, there is but one piece missing for establishing Baxter’s version of the aspect theory of instantiation. We need to find a way of saying that, when a particular instantiates a universal, there is some one thing that is both an aspect of the particular and an aspect of the universal. For this, we need cross-count identity.

### 6. Cross-Count Identity

Let me adjust the terminology a bit before getting into this. I have thus far avoided the notion of identity (as expressed by the sign ‘=’) as far as possible. The problem with identity is that if Socrates and seated Socrates were identical, it seems that they could not differ in being. This is at least what Leibniz’s law tells us: if \( A = B \), nothing can be true of \( A \) without being true of \( B \) and vice versa. But Socrates and seated Socrates differ in being, so it seems that they cannot be identical. On the other hand, if Socrates and seated Socrates were *not* identical, it seems that they could not be the same in number. According to Aristotle, however, they are the same in number.  

One might avoid this difficulty by postulating that identity is really a relative concept, so that ‘\( A \) and \( B \) are identical’ is not subject to the law of non-contradiction, for the same reasons that ‘\( A \) is taller’ is not. Perhaps all identity is either identity in number or identity in being, and one must always say which one it is. Or, alternatively, one might argue that Leibniz’s law does not apply in this case. The reason might be that phrases with ‘qua’ and ‘in so far as’ create non-extensional contexts. I prefer to bypass such questions about the notion of identity for now, by speaking of sameness instead of identity. As I use it here, sameness is indeed a relative concept: things are never simply the same or different, but always the same or different *in some respect* (e.g. in number or in being). I take it that when Baxter speaks of cross-count identity, he means either that two things are the same in number across counts or that they are the same in being across counts.

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8 Lewis sees the first point but not the second [1991: 93]. He says, for instance, that ‘[w]hen we do ontology, we can set Socrates down as one, single object and discover later that there remains a second object to be counted, namely, Socrates + pale’ [1991: 134; my emphasis]. So Lewis thinks that because Socrates and seated Socrates are not identical, they must be numerically distinct. This, however, also does not seem right.
We need the notion of cross-count sameness because instantiation happens between a particular and a kind, and according to Baxter, particulars and their kinds live in different counts. In the default count, there are exactly as many distinct things as there are particulars. According to a different way of counting, there are as many distinct things as there are different kinds of particulars. Now, suppose that (1) we agree that both particulars and kinds have aspects, and that (2) we want to say that a particular instantiates a kind if and only if an aspect of the particular is the same as an aspect of the kind. The question will be this. In what sense of ‘same’ can we maintain that an aspect of a particular is the same as an aspect of a kind? This cannot be sameness within a count. The problem comes out clearly when considering Underwood’s attempt at defining cross-count identity [2010: 269]:

**UNDERWOOD:** A is cross-count identical with B iff there is an M such that in one count A is identical with M and in another count B is identical with M.  

This gives rise to the following question. What gives anyone the right to use the same letter for entities that belong to different counts? If A is a particular and M is an aspect of A, then M is numerically one by being numerically the same as A. Likewise, if B is a kind and M is an aspect of B, then M is presumably one in number by being numerically the same as B. M inherits its identity and countability from A and B, respectively [cf. Baxter 2001: 461]. It is one in number within each count, but it is nothing in number independently of the two counts. Hence, it cannot do what Underwood wants it to do. It cannot as one and the same mediate between different counts. In fact, Underwood is cheating by using the same letter in both contexts. His definition should actually read as follows: A is cross-count identical with B iff there are M and N such that (i) in one count A is identical with M, (ii) in another count B is identical with N, and (iii) M and N are identical. But this, of course, would not be a definition of cross-count identity, for M and N still live in different counts. If M and N are identical at all, they can only be cross-count identical.

Underwood’s mistake is to assume that the entity that mediates between a particular and a kind can be referred to as one thing, independently of a given count. Baxter does not commit this mistake. He admits that aspects cannot be numerically one outside a count. He says that aspects are not individuated, and thus not individuals, and that therefore they cannot be counted at all [2013: 297]. This might be a slight exaggeration on his part, since there are two ways in which aspects may be individuated. First, if aspects are things in respects, they are as individual as these things. If

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9 The metaphor of ‘living in’ a count is my own. That a thing ‘lives in’ a count means that its identity and persistence conditions are tied to this count, so that it is one thing in this count but possibly several different things in another count.

10 This is simply a matter of translating statements of the form ‘There are n X in the world’ into ‘There are n things in the X-count.’ These two express the very same fact, so neither of them can be known or shown before the other one is known or shown.

11 I have modified his definition in respects that don’t matter here. The original is: ‘A is p/u cross-count identical with B iff there is a Z such that A is p-identical with Z and B is u-identical with Z.’ Note that Underwood’s version of cross-count identity is not symmetric.
Socrates is one thing, seated Socrates is one thing, too. Second, aspects may be distinguished from other aspects in terms of their form, so that one may individuate aspects in terms of differences in being. What Baxter should have said here is that aspects are not individuated \textit{in themselves}. They can be counted and individuated only by counting and individuating the specimens of kinds that are involved in them. Seated Socrates in one only because Socrates is one, and seated Socrates differs from snub-nosed Socrates only because being seated differs from being snub-nosed.

Aristotle famously points out that the assumption of countable universals leads to serious trouble. This is the fundamental error that he ascribes to Plato. It is to confuse forms, which are not countable, with particulars, which are countable. Moreover, Aristotle also argues that \textit{aspects} (i.e. accidental compounds) are not countable. He refers to countable things as ‘thises’ (\textit{tode ti}). In \textit{Sophistical Refutations} 22, he writes that whereas Coriscus is a this, \textit{educated Coriscus} is not a this but merely a ‘such’ (\textit{toionde}).\textsuperscript{12} He says that one cannot separate educated Coriscus from Coriscus \cite{179a1-C03}, for otherwise, the Third Man Argument would follow \cite{178b36-C07}. He does not specify exactly how this would follow, but it is clear enough what he has in mind. Just as educated Coriscus is an aspect, the man Coriscus is an aspect. If aspects were separate ‘thises’, they would differ in number from the substances that are involved in them. Therefore, Coriscus and Coriscus \textit{qua} man would be two numerically different men. As a consequence, there would be a third man: the aspect, Coriscus \textit{qua} man, in so far as \textit{it} is a man. This version of the Third Man differs slightly from other, more familiar, ones; but it is reasonably similar. In order to avoid it, Aristotle insists that aspects are not countable in themselves. They cannot be both separated from particulars and yet remain countable.

Now if aspects are not countable in themselves, there is no way in which an aspect can be numerically the same as another aspect, unless both aspects belong to the same count. As far as countability goes, what happens in a count stays in this count. From this it should follow that cross-count sameness is not numerical sameness, and this is in fact what Baxter suggests \cite[2013: 293]{2013}.\textsuperscript{13}

However, it is not clear what other kind of sameness it could be. If aspects of universals and aspects of particulars were the same in being, this would mean that they both instantiate the same kind of thing. But kinds of things are universals, and the idea that an aspect of a universal instantiates the same universal as an aspect of a particular is rather difficult to grasp. After all, if instantiation is to be explained in terms of some kind of sameness between aspects, this sameness should not amount to the aspects instantiating the same universal.

I submit that Baxter’s theory is unnecessarily complicated. Instead of postulating counts and aspects for both particulars and universals, he should have started with a distinction between (1) countable particulars, which may have aspects, and (2) kinds, which may have instances but are not countable.

\textsuperscript{12} Baxter implicitly refers to Aristotle when he writes that instantiation ‘is cross-count partial identity between a “this” and a “such”’ \cite[460]{2001}.
and have no aspects. In order to flesh this out, I will now return to the twelfth century.

7. The Indifferentist View

The first position that Abelard ascribed to William of Champeaux was Platonist in that it took a universal to be a single substance that underlies its many instances. The second position is Aristotelian in that it puts particulars at the bottom. Both views, however, assume that the whole universal, and not a part of it, is somehow present in each of its instances. Abelard describes William’s revised view as follows [Historia Calamitatum, ed. Monfrin: 65]:

He corrected his view in this way, that he now maintained that they [the particulars] are the same thing not substantially, but indifferently.

Two instances of a kind are no longer taken to be two features of one and the same underlying substance; rather, they are the same by way of being indifferent. This is Abelard’s somewhat cryptic way of putting it. He mentions the view only briefly, and his characterization is probably biased [cf. Thompson 1995]. It is likely, however, that William’s modified view coincides with a theory that used to be fairly widespread in the early twelfth century. This theory is known as indifferentism. The basic idea is that two distinct particulars may be literally the same kind of thing, in so far as they do not differ from each other in some respect. If a kind is instantiated by many things, each of them is, in a certain respect, this kind. Thus a kind that is instantiated many times is the same as numerically many things, i.e. it is many in number. On the other hand, one and the same particular may, in different respects, be many kinds in different respects. That is, it may be many in being.

Walter of Mortagne describes indifferentism as a combination of two theses: (1) that universals are like matter for their instances, and (2) that everything that exists is particular. He writes [Tractatus quoniam de generali, ed. Hauréau: 312; cf. King 1982: 135†]:

[I]f there are genera and species, they are the matter of particulars: indeed, they must be particulars. But they are these particulars themselves as well as genera and species. Therefore, the same substance is a genus, a species, and a particular, so that Socrates is a particular, a lowest species, an intermediate genus, and a highest genus. Which one of these he is is discerned through different attentions (attentiones).

What Walter tells us here is the following. If there are any universals, they show up by constituting particulars. Since there is nothing above and beyond particulars, universals must actually be particulars. Since one universal can show up in many particulars, we must admit that one universal can be many in number. We can do this by using the notion of a respect: One particular can be many universals in different respects, and in the same way, one universal can be many particulars. Plato, in so far as he is human, is the kind *human being*, and Socrates, in so far as he is human, is the very same kind of thing. In this sense, universals are nothing but particulars in respects. Universals are aspects.

Adelard of Bath puts this as follows [*De eodem et diverso*, ed. Willner: 11, 20–1]:

For if you consider things, the labels ‘genus’, ‘species’, and ‘particular’ apply to the same substance, but in different respects.

That is, again, Socrates is in one respect a particular substance, in another respect a species (human being), in still another respect a genus (mammal), and so on. The same thing is both a universal and a particular, but in different respects [cf. Abelard, *Glossulae*, ed. Geyer II: 518,18].

So we may pin down the following as the indifferentist view:

**INDIFFERENTISM:** In so far as a particular instantiates a universal, it is this universal.

Since the indifferentists share Aristotle’s view that the primary objects of counting are particular substances, their view implies that there are (numerically) as many kinds of particulars as there are particulars. However, they also distinguish numerical differences from differences in being. Abelard writes [*Glossae super Porphyrium*, ed. Geyer I: 14, 22–4; tr. Spade: 34–5; modified]:

With respect to the *number of things*, they maintain as many species as particulars, and as many genera. But with respect to *similarity of natures*, they assign a lesser number of universals than of particulars.

The indifferentists thus distinguish between two ways of being many. When it comes to the number of things, there are as many things as there are particular substances. However, with respect to sameness in being, there are as many things as there are *kinds* of such substances.

This is an aspect theory of instantiation. It aims to explain what it means to instantiate a kind by employing the notion of an aspect. It differs from Baxter’s theory as follows. When Baxter says that in some respect particulars are the same as universals, he takes this sameness to obtain across counts; for particulars and universals live in different counts. When indifferentists say that particulars are the same as universals, they simply mean that universals *are* nothing but aspects of particulars, and particulars and their aspects live in the same count. There is, in fact, only one count. The *number*
of universals is the number of particulars; there is only one number of things. Hence, according to the indifferentist, particulars and universals belong to the same count. Therefore, indifferentists need not endow aspects with the power to bridge a gap between two counts.  

Our forays into the history of philosophy thus help to simplify the aspect theory of instantiation. Instead of postulating aspects of particulars and universals, and then claiming that instantiation happens when aspects of particulars are the same as aspects of universals, we simply need to postulate that for a particular to have an aspect is the same as for a universal to have an instance. Universals are aspects of particulars, just as particulars are instances of universals. If we put it in this way, we no longer need to assume that aspects or universals can be counted in themselves. All that we need to be able to count are particulars, for the number of particulars is the number of things there are. Universals are individuated in terms of their definition, and this way of individuating universals does not provide a reliable basis for counting them.

8. Conclusion

I agree with Aristotle that, strictly speaking, only one way of counting determines the number of entities in the world. The number of things is the number of particular substances. In themselves, universals have no number. They are individuated in terms of being rather than number.

On this basis, I have made partial sense of the idea that universals have aspects. It is true that, just as one particular can be many kinds of things, one universal can be many. However, particulars and universals are not one and many in the same sense. Particulars are and remain numerically one. One particular cannot be many in number. It can be many only by differing from itself in being. For instance, Socrates can be many by being both seated and snub-nosed. These differences in being yield different aspects. Conversely, since universals are individuated in terms of their being, they cannot be many in being. The only way they can differ from themselves is in number. For instance, the kind human being can be many by being both Plato qua human and Socrates qua human. This is possible because universals are not individuated in terms of their number. For a universal to be one is not for it to be numerically one thing; it is to be one in being. Therefore, universals can be one in being and yet many in number.

This is where I part ways with Baxter. Since universals cannot be many in being, they cannot have aspects. I think it is misleading to call something an aspect that is not individuated in terms of being. Aspects have something to do with qualitative diversity. But when Socrates and Hypatia instantiate the kind philosopher, they are not qualities of this kind in the same sense as that in which philosopher is a quality of them. It is better to say, as Porphyry does, that, whereas a particular is many in being and one in number, a kind

14 Note, however, that in an attempt to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, Adelard of Bath claims that a divine mind could consider universals in their simplicity in isolation [De eodem et diverso, ed. Willner: 12, 15–20; cf. Reiners 1907: 24].
is many in number but one in being. Whereas particulars are many by having several aspects, kinds are many by having several instances. The things that Baxter refers to as ‘aspects’ of universals do not differ from one another in being. They differ from one another in number only, and particulars are precisely what differ in number. As a slogan, instance is the converse of aspect. Instances are for universals what aspects are for particulars. There is a lot of symmetry here. One particular can be many (in being) by having many aspects, and two particulars can be one (in being) by being the same in a respect. One universal can be many (in number) by having many instances, and two universals can be one (in number) by coinciding in one instance. This is a very simple version of the aspect theory of instantiation.

Having located significant parts of this theory in the early twelfth century, one obvious next step will be to check whether the arguments that Abelard and others have mounted against indifferentism are convincing. For, as John of Salisbury reports, indifferentism was pretty much dead by the middle of the twelfth century [Metalogicon II 17, CCCM 98: 2]. If this happened for a good reason, the prospects for aspect theories of instantiation might not be good after all. Unfortunately, although Abelard’s criticism does seem rather superficial to me, I cannot go into this here.15

References
Adelaed of Bath 1903. De eodem et diverso, ed. H. Willner, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters IV/1, Münster: Aschendorff.

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