

Auszug aus Anscombe, "The Justice of the Present War Examined"

Before considering whether or not there are any persons who may not be attacked in war, we must try to elucidate, in however crude a fashion, the doctrine of intention in human acts. For in all actions of rational beings we can distinguish three ends of action: there is the motive or motives of the agent, the proper effect of the act as such, and the completed act itself. These are not always distinct in fact, but they can be; if they do coincide this does not make them less distinct in nature, though the distinction is sometimes subtle. For example, take the action of a carpenter in the stroke of a chisel. His motive may be the glory of God, or the obtaining of wages, of the satisfaction of a completed job, or several or all of these, and more besides. The proper effect of the act as such is the removal of a shaving of wood, and this may also be considered as one of the ends of the agent as well as of the action. The completed act itself is simply the complete successful stroke. Let us apply this analysis to military attack. The motive may be to win the war, or medals, or simply to attack successfully and destroy the enemy who receive the impact of the attack. The proper effect is the weakening, disabling or destruction of those who receive that impact. The completed act itself is the [p. 75] completed attack, or in the case, let us say, of bombing, the dropping and explosion in the right place of the bomb.

Now as to morals. If an act is to be lawful, it is not sufficient that the motives of the agent should be good, though this is necessary. First, the act itself must not be intrinsically wrong; it must not be such an act as is wrong under any circumstance. Second, the proper effects of the act must be permissible. And unless these conditions are present, the act is wrong. To apply these principles once more in the case of military attack: an attack on men is not intrinsically vicious: is not, that is, a perverted act; it is circumstances that make it right or wrong. The motive of the attackers belongs to a consideration of aims rather than of means; or, if we are considering individual soldiers, it is matter for God at the last Judgment, not for us here. But what of the proper effects of the completed action? These, as we have seen, consist in the destruction of the persons attacked. If, therefore, the attack is to be lawful, the persons attacked must be persons whom the attacker may legitimately destroy. Our object is to consider whether in warfare these person include civilians.

- 21.10. Anscombe, Auszug aus "The Justice of the Present War Examined"
- 28.10. Anscombe, *Intention* §1 und §§23-27
- 04.11. Anscombe, *Intention* §8 und §28-32
- 11.11. Anscombe, "Practical Inference" + *Intention* §42
- 18.11. Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in *Essays on Actions and Events*
- 25.11. Davidson, "Agency," in *Essays on Actions and Events*
+ Feinberg, "Action and Responsibility" and Austin, "A Plea for Excuses"
- 02.12. Davidson, "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" + "Criticism, Comment, and Defense," in *Essays on Actions and Events*
- 09.12. Goldman, "The Individuation of Action"
+ Anscombe, "Under A Description"
- 16.12. ---
- 06.01. Baier, "The Intentionality of Intentions"
- 13.01. Bennett, *The Act Itself*, Kap. 2
+ Bennett, *Events and Their Names*, Kap. 1
- 20.01. Hyman / Alvarez, "Agents and Their Actions"
- 27.01. Thompson, *Life and Action*, Introduction
- 03.02. Thompson, *Life and Action*, Kap. 5-7
- 10.02. Thompson, *Life and Action*, Kap. 8 + Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, Kap. V
- 17.02. ---

G.E.M. Anscombe, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, Oxford 1981.

— — —, *Intention*, 2. Auflage, London 1963.

— — —, "Practical Inference," in Hursthouse, ed., *Virtues and Reasons*. Oxford: University Press 1995.

Annette Baier, "The Intentionality of Intentions," *Review of Metaphysics* 30, 1977.

Jonathan Bennett, *Events and Their Names*, Oxford 1988.

— — —, *The Act Itself*, Oxford 1995.

Donald Davidson, *Essays on Actions & Events*, Oxford 1980.

Joel Feinberg, *Doing and Deserving*, Princeton University Press 1970.

Alvin Goldman, "The Individuation of Actions," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, 1971.

John Hyman & Maria Alvarez, "Agents and Their Actions," *Philosophy* 73, 1998.

Sebastian Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, Suhrkamp 2005.

Michael Thompson, *Life and Action*, Cambridge, Mass. 2008.