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Recent Work
The Aristotelian doctrine of four causes naturally arises from the
combination of the two distinctions (a) between things and changes,
and (b) between that which potentially is a certain thing or change
and what it potentially is.
I use Austin's distinction of two directions of fit in order to
explain how a priori knowledge is possible.
The biological species concept rests on the notion of reproduction,
which we can only apply if we know what counts as a result of
successful reproduction. Therefore, it presupposes the typological
species concept and cannot, as Ernst Mayr thinks, replace it.
When Descartes
calls the soul of a human being an immaterial substance, he does not contradict the
Aristotelian doctrine according to which the soul of a person is the
substantial form of her body.
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Eine Verteidigung des typologischen
Artbegriffs (excerpt, pdf)