The Four Causes. Habilitationsschrift, Leipzig 2010.
Conscientia bei Descartes. Alber Verlag, Freiburg 2006.
Gibt es eine Rehabilitation der Cartesischen Psychologie? Master Thesis, Leipzig 2000.
"Plato's Ingredient Principle." Ancient Philosophy, forthcoming.
"Instance is the Converse of Aspect." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014 (online).
"Documents: Fillers of Informational Gaps." Monist 97(2), 2014, 246-255.
"'Insofar as' in Descartes' Definition of Thought." Studia Leibnitiana 43(2), 2011, 145-159.
"Kants Modell kausaler Verhältnisse." Kant Studien 102(3), 2011, 367-384.
"Teleonomy." Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14, 2011, 184-201.
"Science, Conscience, Consciousness." History of the Human Sciences 23(3), 2010, 15-28.
"Eine Verteidigung des typologischen Artbegriffs." Philosophia Naturalis 46(2), 2009, 251-278.
"The Four Causes." The Journal of Philosophy 106(3), 2009, 137-60.
"Matter in Z3." Foundations of Science 13, 2008, 199-215.
"Tugenden und Absichten." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115(1), 2008, 165-182.
"Cartesian Conscientia." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(3), 2007, 455-484.
"Conscientia bei Descartes." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 60(1), 2006, 21-36.
"Aristoteles' Beschreibung der ethischen Tugenden." In: Jan Müller & Jens Kertscher, Lebensform und Praxisform. Forthcoming, 2015.
"Constituent Functions." In: Christer Svennerlind et al., eds., Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag 2013.
"Das Segeltuchmodell." In: Sebastian Rödl & Henning Tegtmeyer, eds., Sinnkritisches Philosophieren. Berlin: De Gruyter 2012.
"Descartes." In: Tina-Louise Eissa & Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, eds., Geschichte der Bioethik. Paderborn: mentis Verlag 2011, 137-148.
"Is Causation a Relation?" In: Keith Allen & Tom Stoneham, eds., Causation and Modern Philosophy. Routledge 2011, 188-200.
"Consciousness as Spontaneous Knowledge." In: Petr Glombicek & James Hill, eds., Essays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern Philosophy. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2010, 7-27.
"What is Formal Ontology?" and "Occurrents." In: Katherine Munn & Barry Smith, eds., Applied Ontology: An Introduction. Ontos Verlag 2008, 39-56 and 255-284.
"Zeitliche Entitäten: Geschehnisse." In: Ludger Jansen, ed., Biomedizinische Ontologie. Zürich: VDF Hochschulverlag 2008, 127-154.
"Ghazali on Immaterial Substances." In: Christian Kanzian & Muhammad Legenhausen, eds., Substance and Attribute in Islamic Philosophy. Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag 2007, 55-66.
"Social Facts Explained and Presupposed." In: Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann, eds., Facets of Sociality. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag 2006, 243-263.
"Holistic Arguments for Individualism." In: Georg Meggle, ed., Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Frankfurt: Hänsel Hohenhausen 2002, 103-123.
"Luhmann und die Formale Mathematik." In: P.-U. Merz Benz, G. Wagner, eds., Die Logik der Systeme. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag 2000, 157-198.
Stephan Schmid, Finalursachen in der frühen Neuzeit. HOPOS 3(1), 2013, p. 179-182.
Johannes Haag, Erfahrung und Gegenstand. Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, Heft 3, 2007, p. 209-14.
"Disposition." Hans Jörg Sandkühler et al., ed., Enzyklopädie Philosophie, Hamburg: Meiner Verlag 2010.
The Four Causes
Gibt es eine Rehabilitation
der Cartesischen Psychologie?
Papers and Abstracts
According to Donald Baxter's Aspect Theory of Instantiation, a particular instantiates a universal when an aspect of the particular is also an aspect of the universal. According to an improved version of this account, this happens when the universal is an aspect of the particular.
I use Austin's distinction of two directions of fit in order to explain how a priori knowledge is possible.
The Aristotelian doctrine of four causes naturally arises from the combination of the two distinctions (a) between things and changes, and (b) between that which potentially is a certain thing or change and what it potentially is.
The biological species concept rests on the notion of reproduction, which we can only apply if we know what counts as a result of successful reproduction. Therefore, it presupposes the typological species concept and cannot, as Ernst Mayr thinks, replace it.
For something to be a living being is to engage in activities whose success is determined by criteria that emerge exclusively from a proper account of the nature of the living being in question.
Life is not a describable property of things. In order to understand what life is, we must start with our conception of the life that we know, human life, and reduce the notion of this life to a notion of mere life.
We can accept Plato's "ingredient principle" when we replace the distinction between things and properties with a slightly different one.
In Metaphysics Z3, Aristotle suggests that matter may be that about a composite substance or "this such" to which a bare "this" would refer in isolation. However, since a bare "this" would refer to nothing, Aristotle rejects this conception of matter.
Action Theory and Ethics
Virtues are not character traits of individual agents, but generic ways of acting; this is why Anscombe found them important, and this is how Aristotle talks about them.
Outline for a teaching sample.
This is not a translation of "Tugenden und Absichten," but a presentation with similar content. Among other things, I argue that intentions are terms in which intentional actions are properly classified and described; and virtues are for generic actions what intentions are particular actions.
Intentions are not events that cause an action, but that in terms of which we describe and action when we describe it as intentionally. Likewise, virtues are not character traits that reliably cause certain behaviour, but that in terms of which we describe certain generic behaviour.
Moral conscience in early medieval ethics.
Review of Pawlenka, ed., Sportethik.
Inpidualistic theories of Social Facts are not altogether circular, but they still start on the wrong foot.
Holism, in one of its varieties, is not the opposite of individualism. Rather, individualism is its consequence.
According to Descartes, a thought is what happens in us if and insofar as we are conscious of it. This means that what happens in us is a thought only in a certain respect. It is something other than a thought, namely consciousness of a thought, in another respect.
Descartes claims that God is a substance and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible.
When Descartes calls the soul of a human being an immaterial substance, he does not contradict the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the soul of a person is the substantial form of her body.
Descartes defines the mind as something whose activities are subject to an evaluation according to which they are, in principle, corrigible.
Descartes uses 'conscientia' in the traditional sense, roughly meaning 'moral conscience'.
Something is a document insofar as its official function is to compensate for the impossibility of immediately acquiring information that has a function (= plays a role in a practice).
Some details on the history of the term "person".
Forms and potentials inhere in a receptacle that exemplifies them, whereas universals and possibilities may inhere in a substratum that does not exemplify them, such as the intellect.
The use of George Spencer Browns Logic of Distinctions by the Sociologist Niklas Luhmann.
An essay on getting married.
A close paraphrase of Heidegger's Being and Time §18 on how we make sense of items in the world in terms of their generic ways of functioning.